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I . INTRODUCTION
This thesis will examine the Department of Defense
Planning System, past present, and one of the many
alternatives proposed for the future. Through this
examination, it is the objective of this thesis to provide
documentation which indicates that the present system may not
provide appropriate attention to near-term warfighting
capabilities.
The primary question this thesis will address is: Does
the present Defense Planning System unduly emphasize force
capabilities in the future at the expense of operational
readiness in the present? Investigation reports of recent
operations will be cited which highlight some of the
deficiencies in the present system that are believed to have
contributed to mission failures and loss of American lives.
Through the examination of a mission-oriented approach as
an alternative to the present system, this thesis will address
a second question: Will a change in the present allocation of
defense resources as proposed in the mission-oriented model
actually enhance near-term warfighting capabilities? This
thesis will examine the direct relationship between the
allocation of resources and the decision-making process of the
present system.
The decision-making process is severely hindered by
Congressional oversight, powerful influence by the military
departments, and a blurred chain of command which emerges
during the execution of operational plans. Missions are
multiservice operations and require extensive coordination
among the planners and the participants. The present Defense
Planning System does not tend to encourage jointness.
Consequently, as military incidents and mishaps will reflect,
appropriate attention to specific details may be overlooked.
Failures not only cost lives, they also damage the reputation
of the U.S. warfighting capability. The thesis will examine
the reforms which have been implemented to strengthen the
chain of command and propose that in addition, the allocation
of defense resources should be changed to complement the
command structure.
II. PRE-1961 PLANNING SYSTEM
Prior to 1961 the Secretary of Defense played a relatively
modest role in the force planning and acquisition process compared
to what came afterward.
When the Constitution of the United States was drafted, our
national security objectives were modest. A small permanent
military establishment was all that was deemed necessary. Funding
for this establishment was provided by the states and became known
as the War Department. The Secretary of War headed the department
and was a cabinet member.
The War Department was initially comprised of ground forces
but as the world environment changed, our national security
requirements grew. In 1798 the Department of the Navy was created
with the Marine Corps being organized shortly after. But it was
not until 1834 that the Marine Corps was placed under the authority
of the Secretary of the Navy. The War Department then consisted of
two executive departments.
During the next century both the Army and the Navy grew
rapidly due to westward expansion and acquisition of territories in
the Caribbean and Pacific. Problems in the War Department surfaced
earlier but gained real momentum during the Spanish-American War in
1903. In 1821 a Commanding General of the Army position was
created who was in charge of discipline and military control, while
the Secretary of the War Department had control of the resources
required to support the Army.
Solving the problem of dual control led to the creation of
the Office of Chief of Staff supported by a General Staff Corps,
doing away with the Commanding General position. The senior
general at the War Department would serve as advisor to the
Secretary of War. In 1915 similar problems evolved within the Navy
which led to the creation of the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations.
Another problem was highlighted during the Spanish-American
War, which is still around today, the unification of all components
(ground, sea and air) of the national defense establishment. The
lack of coordination between the War Department and The Navy
Department emerged during the Mexican War of 1848 and the Civil
War, but during the Spanish-American War it became a major issue.
In response, a new Joint Board was created which consisted of four
officers from each service. The purpose of the Joint Board was to
provide coordination between the two military departments, but
there are no big success stories. Even during World War I they
only met twice!
Following World War I discussion of unification of the
services surfaced. This discussion was driven by the high cost of
war and the need for economy and efficiency, and due to a new
technology, aircraft. With the birth of aviation came a possible
need for a third military department which placed great emphasis on
unification. It wasn't until during World War II that the Joint
Chiefs of Staff was created having a broader purpose than the old
Joint Board. Unified commands were also established during this
period of time, although full legislative authority for these
changes did not take place until the National Security Act of 1947.
In 1945 President Truman "proposed to Congress a single
Department of National Defense, headed by a cabinet secretary and
supported by an Under Secretary and several Assistant Secretaries."
(Hitch, 1966, p. 14) Truman's proposal called for three military
branches, each reporting to an Assistant Secretary, and each having
a military commander. The proposal also called for integrated
plans and a unified military program and budget. It also "stressed
the economies that could be achieved through the unification of
supply and service functions, the need for strong civilian control
and the requirement for unity of command in outlying bases."
(Hitch, 1966, p. 15)
When all was said and done, the National Security Act of 1947
was not what Truman had recommended.
It provided for the creation of a National Military
Establishment headed by a Secretary of Defense and
comprising three separately organized and administered
executive departments - Army, Navy, and Air Force -
retaining in these departments "all power and duties
relating to such Departments not specifically conferred
upon the Secretary of Defense." In effect, the National
Security Act of 1947 established not a unified department
or even a federation, but a confederation of three
military departments presided over by a Secretary of
Defense with carefully enumerated powers. (Hitch, 1966,
p. 15)
The first Secretary of Defense was Mr. James Forrestal. In
just a little more than a year in the newly established position he
had strong recommendations concerning the statutory authority
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of the Secretary of Defense. The 1947 Act had authorized the
Secretary to establish only "general" policies and programs, and to
exercise only "general" direction, authority, and control. In 1949
the act was amended which provide:
The primacy of the Secretary of Defense as the principal
assistant to the President on defense matters was
stressed. The Army, the Navy, and the Air Force lost
their status as executive departments and all that went
with it. The Secretary of Defense was given a Deputy and
three Assistant Secretaries, a Chairman was provided for
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Joint Staff was
increased from 100 to 210 officers. And, finally, TITLE
IV was added to the Act creating the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, and providing
for uniform budget and fiscal procedures throughout the
Department. (Hitch, 1966, p. 16)
In 1953 the Defense Department's top management was
reorganized again. Some agencies were done away with and the
Secretary of Defense gained six additional Assistant Secretaries to
carry out the work of the cancelled agencies.
In 1958 the Act was amended to increase the responsibilities
and authority of the Secretary of Defense, with particular emphasis
on the area of operational direction of the armed forces and in the
research and development area.
The three military departments were no longer to be
separately administered and instead were only to be
separately organized. A new post of Director, Defense
Research and Engineering was created, not only to
"supervise" research and development activities, but to
"direct and control" those activities needing centralized
management. Also in the 1958 reorganization the military
departments, which had been acting as executive agents in
the operational control of the unified and specified
commands, were taken out of the command chain, so that the
line of command now runs from the President to the
Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
the unified commands. And finally, to enable it to carry
out it's enlarged functions, the Joint Staff was
strengthened further from 210 to 400 officers. (Hitch,
1966, pp. 16-17)
Through these changes the Secretary of Defense position
emerged as the true operational leader of the Defense Department.
Some reorganization and unification that took place after the 1958
Act:
1. Unified commands were created.
2. Joint contingency plans were drafted by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff for several possible situations.
3. The civilian Secretaries took control of the over-all
level of the defense budget and brought it into line with
the fiscal policy of the administration.
Each of these laws, the Act of 1947 and the Act of 1958,
"represented a major step in the integration of the defense
establishment and the consolidation of power in the hands of the
Secretary of Defense." (Enthoven and Smith, 1971, pp. 2-3) The
1958 Act clearly gave
the Secretary of Defense the authority to determine the
force structure of the combatant commands, to supervise
all research and engineering activities of the Department,
and to transfer, reassign, abolish, and consolidate
combatant functions. (Enthoven and Smith, 1971, pp. 2-3)
Between 1947 and 1961 substantial progress was made in
improving the organization and legal structure of the U.
S. defense establishment. The Office of the Secretary of
Defense was created and gradually strengthened as a
center-seeking force to counter the centrifugal thrust of
the three Services. The Secretary's role slowly evolved
from that of a relatively powerless arbiter to that of a
major participant in the decision-making process ....
Despite this progress, however, there was much unfinished
business in defense management in 1961. (Enthoven and
Smith, 1971, p. 8)
Some of the most important areas of unfinished business
leading into 1961 included:
1. Inadequate Means of Central Leadership
The Secretary of Defense was still looked at as a judge
rather than a leader.
Contributing to this view was the lack of information
and control systems available to provide the Secretary
of Defense the management tools necessary to manage a
department the size and complexity of DOD.
Each Service was basically working independently.
Each was concerned about their own: mission, budget
share, supply system, force structure, cost of
readiness, and combat capability.
2. Defense Budget
a. Rather than a mechanism for integrating strategy,
forces, and costs, it was essentially a bookkeeping
device for dividing funds between Services and
accounts, and a blunt instrument for keeping a lid on
defense spending. The information contained in the
defense budget was primarily useful for day-to-day
administration .... It was not very useful for
helping the President, members of the Congress, and
the Secretary of Defense to establish priorities and
choose between competing programs. (Enthoven and
Smith, 1971, p. 11)
b. The strategy and forces were approached as basically
military decisions, and the budget was viewed as a
civilian function. This gap was a major problem in
rational defense planning.
c. Financial planning only looked at one year ahead which led
to program decisions being made without considering future
costs.
3. Duplication and overlap in research and development
programs was wasting valuable resources, time, and
funding.
Prior to 1961 the defense budgeting process was referred
to as the "budget ceiling" approach. The President would indicate
the level of defense expenditures and the Secretary of Defense
would allocate this figure, usually egually, among the three
military departments. In turn, each military department would
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prepare an annual budget allocating ceilings among components.
Additional requests would be presented in the form of an addendum.
Since there was no set guidance on national strategy and priorities
by the National Security Council, each military department was left
to their own interpretation and pressures from their own internal
institution as to where to best spend their share of defense
dollars. The result was that civilian leaders were concerned
almost exclusively about the total budget level, instead of
military effectiveness and need.
The changes brought about by the 1947 Act and the 1958
Act did little to decrease the authority and independence of the
military departments. The President could overrule any realloca-
tion made by the Joint Chiefs so there was no incentive for the
military departments to work towards a unified defense policy. The
military departments were still bargaining on their own behalf with
no one looking at the Defense Department as a whole and the budget
was still piecemeal financing conforming to fixed ceilings. The
only solution would be to have a strong President and Secretary of
Defense to impose a unified defense solution. "It was against this
background of continued Defense by Bargaining that Mr. Robert
McNamara became Secretary of Defense in 1961." (Hobkirk, 1983, p.
29)
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III. PLANNING SYSTEM SINCE 1961
Before 1961 the Secretary of Defense acted largely as a
referee arbitrating differences between the military depart-
ments. He was largely reactive vs. proactive. While the 1958
Reorganization gave the Secretary of Defense much expanded
power to manage the Department of Defense, the absence of an
effective Management Information System made it difficult if
not impossible to exercise these new powers effectively.
McNamara changed this: He accepted the position of Secretary
of Defense determined to be an effective leader and shape the
U.S. national security strategy and military forces.
Secretary McNamara brought not only extraordinary
managerial ability and drive but also a new concept of
management to the Department of Defense. He made it clear
at the outset that he wanted to exercise fully his
statutory authority, that he wanted all defense problems
approached in a rational and analytical way, and that he
wanted them resolved on the basis of the national
interest. March 1961, he shocked the Department by
assigning ninety-six separate projects (complete with
specific questions and deadlines) to it's various
components for analysis and review. Many of the projects
concerned items that had long been considered sacrosanct.
He made clear his belief in active management from the
top. (Enthoven and Smith, 1971, p. 32)
McNamara decided that new management methods would be more
useful in achieving his goals than another reorganization of
the department.
McNamara described the situation: From the beginning in
January 1961, it seemed to me that the principal problem
in efficient management of the Department's resources was
not the lack of management authority. The problem was
rather the absence of the essential management tools
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needed to make sound solutions on the really crucial
issues of national security. (Enthoven and Smith, 1971,
pp. 32-33)
One of the first deficiencies highlighted was the lack of
adequate management information and control systems. This
problem was assigned to Charles J. Hitch, the Comptroller.
Hitch, "formerly Head of the Economics Division at Rand, was
one of the nation's leading authorities on program budgeting
and the application of economic analysis to defense problems."
(Enthoven and Smith, 1971, p. 33)
Hitch's task was to conduct a systematic analysis of all
requirements and to incorporate them into a five-year,
program-oriented defense budget. This marked the birth of the
Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS) . The only
similar effort was in 1955-56 when the Joint Chiefs of Staff
developed the first Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP)
which projected requirements for major forces for four to five
years in the future, but it was basically a "pasting together
of unilaterally developed service plans." (Hitch, 1966, p.
25) The JSOP is prepared with the assistance of the military
departments, and represents to the Secretary of Defense the
force level that the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe are
required to carry out national strategy and military objec-
tives. "Before 1969, the JSOP consistently recommended forces
costing 25 to 3 5 percent more than those finally approved by
the President and Congress." (Enthoven and Smith, 1971, pp.
94-95) No Secretary of Defense would approve the forces
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recommended by the JSOP. The document was viewed as evidence
that the military could not present realistic alternatives to
the Secretary of Defense. The JSOP also is an example of the
gap between defense planning and budgeting which was a driving
force in the development of the PPBS. This gap could have
had severe impact on the cost of defense: "... during the
seven years of McNamara's leadership, total defense spending
would have been over $120 billion higher if he had approved
all the JSOP-recommended forces." (Enthoven and Smith, 1971,
p. 95)
PPBS stands out as the most significant change that has
taken place in the defense budget process.
The fundamental idea behind PPBS was decision-making based
on explicit criteria of the national interest in defense
programs, as opposed to decision-making by compromise
among various institutional, parochial, or other vested
interests in the Defense Department. (Enthoven and Smith,
1971, p. 33)
Another basic idea of PPBS was to bridge the gap between
military planning and budgeting. This gap resulted in an
imbalance between planned forces and the actual budgets and
programs which are to support them.
. . . the fact is that our total resources are always
limited and must be allocated among many competing needs
in our society .... Benefits and costs are associated
with every defense program .... The emphasis is not on
cost, but on cost and effectiveness together. (Enthoven
and Smith, 1971, p. 36)
An example of the consequences resulting from this gap between
planning and budgeting;
When the defense budget had to be cut, inevitably the
prestige items (carriers, divisions, air wings) were
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retained and the unglamorous but essential support items
(ammunition, spare parts, fuel) were cut .... In 1961
the Army had managed to hold on to fourteen divisions in
it's force structure, but had only a few weeks' supply of
ammunition and logistics support for these divisions, and
that in unbalanced amounts. (Enthoven and Smith, 1971, p.
36)
Each military department exercised it's own priorities,
focusing on their own missions to the detriment of joint
missions. They each attempted to lay the budgeting groundwork
for a greater share of the defense resources in future budget
years "by concentrating on alluring new weapons systems and
protecting the size of their forces, even at the cost of
readiness." (Hitch, 1966, p. 24) The role of programming was
to bridge this gap between the already established planning
and budgeting elements of the defense budgeting process.
Within the programming phase lies the second most signifi-
cant contribution of the McNamara era, the use of systems
analysis and the establishment of a powerful Office of Systems
Analysis, initially reporting to the Comptroller but soon
reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense.
From 1961 onwards, increasing use was made of quantitative
techniques drawn from mathematics, statistics, and
economics to help in the choice between systems. These
techniques have a number of names of which "systems
analysis" is the best known. Systems analysis attempts to
calculate the effectiveness of a complete weapon system in
operation against a rational and responsive adversary.
(Hobkirk, 1983, p. 30)
Systems analysis was a vital part of the decision-making
process when comparing competing options within the same
program. Some refer to cost-effectiveness as the main
justification for PPBS.
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Many found it interesting that initially McNamara brought
in outside experts as a separate group to conduct system
analyses rather than have the existing bureaucracy adopt
system analysis. Robert Art wrote,
The revolutionary manner in which McNamara made his
decision . . . transformed the "expert" career bureaucrat
into the "novice" and the "inexperienced" political
appointee into the "professional." By demanding that
decisions be made through a cost-effectiveness analysis,
McNamara freed himself from the Secretary's usual depen-
dence on the experience and knowledge of the military
officer and the career civil servant. By demanding
something that only he and his small personal professional
staff possessed the experience and competence to do,
McNamara declared insufficient or invalid, or both, the
customary criteria for making decisions and the tradi-
tional grounds for justifying them. (Hobkirk, 1983, pp.
99-100)
Opposition was voiced extensively to the use of cost-
effectiveness studies in the decision-making process and it
is still controversial.
. . . opposition to cost-effectiveness studies stems not
only from a suspicion of quantitative analysis but also a
conviction - completely unsubstantiated but nevertheless
firmly held - that these studies inevitably lead to
decisions favoring the cheapest weapon. (Hitch, 1966, p.
46)
In actuality the concern is: "Which strategy offers the
greatest amount of military effectiveness for a given outlay?
Or . . . . How can a given level of military effectiveness be
achieved at least costs?" (Hitch, 1966, p. 47 and p. 58)
Systems analysis provides the analytical foundation for the
making of sound objective choices among the alternative means
of carrying out these missions.
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It is obvious why the military would oppose a systems analysis
group reporting at a high level in the Department of Defense.
From the establishment of the Defense Department the military
departments had enjoyed great independence. They were the
experts and through the ad hoc, bargaining environment were
able to exert great power in the national defense arena. Now
under the direction of Secretary McNamara analytical
ascendancy superseded them. By changing the criteria on which
Defense decisions were made, McNamara did not have to rely on
the military to recommend the most effective and economical
programs to the White House and the Congress. He was making
their programs and recommendations subject to scrutiny. The
process moved from decentralized to centralized decision-
making with the Secretary of Defense at the center.
In 1965 Systems Analysis became a separate entity headed
by an Assistant Secretary of Defense. The charter outlined
the responsibilities as:
1. To review, for the Secretary of Defense,
quantitative requirements including, forces,
weapons systems, equipment, personnel, and
nuclear weapons.
2. To assist the Secretary in the initiation,
monitoring, guiding, and reviewing of requirement
studies and cost-effectiveness studies . . .
Under the direction, authority and control of the
Secretary of Defense, the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Systems Analysis) shall perform the following functions:
1. Develop measures of cost and effectiveness in order to
make quickly and accurately analyses of a variety of
alternative programs of force structure, weapons
systems, and other military capabilities projected
over a period of several years.
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2. Assemble, consolidate, summarize, and present data in
various forms so as to show the total implications of
alternative programs in terms of relative costs,








c. Weapons Systems, and Major End Items of Material,
e.g., bombs, torpedoes, ships, vehicles, ammunition
d. Nuclear Weapons
e. Transportation, including mobility and development
f. Information and Communication systems closely
related with the above requirements.
4. Analyze and review quantitative military requirements
of allied and other foreign countries.
5. Assist the Secretary of Defense in initiating,
monitoring, guiding, reviewing and summarizing of
requirements studies. (Enthoven and Smith, 1971, pp.
76-77)
Through this charter, the civilian led Systems Analysis
office was placed in an advisory position that had been held
exclusively by military professionals on the Service and Joint
Chiefs of Staff staffs. There was great animosity on the part
of the Services and many voiced their feelings: Vice-Admiral
Hyman G. Rickover, testifying before a House subcommittee in
1968,
The social scientists who have been making the so-called
cost-effectiveness studies have little or no scientific
training or technical expertise; they know little about
naval operations .... Their studies are, in general,
abstractions. They read more like the rules of a game of
classroom logic than like a prognosis of real events in
the real world .... (Enthoven and Smith, 1971, p. 78)
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There was also Congressional opposition to having civilian
analysts as the key advisors to the Secretary of Defense.
McNamara's point of view,
the Systems Analysis office was a group of men who worked
for him and him alone, with his problems and the national
interest seen with a perspective similar to his own upper-
most in their minds. The existence of such an analytical
staff freed him from total dependence on the military
staffs. It enabled him to lead - to challenge, question,
propose, and resolve disputes - instead of merely serving
as a referee or a helpless bystander. (Enthoven and
Smith, 1971, p. 80)
During this period the Secretary of Defense became a
powerful advisor to the President. Since the President
presents his legislative and budgetary programs to Congress
each year, it is critical that the defense budget request be
realistic and in balance with other national objectives.
Congress holds the purse strings and defense policy issues
involve much more than the question of military operations.
National policy issues involving political, economic, and
technical factors must be addressed as well as military ones.
In the intense political environment that surrounds defense
policy, varied backgrounds, disciplines and points of view
contribute to a more balanced, supportable program.
Attempts were made in 197 to abolish the Systems Analysis
office but failed. What did take place was the original
charter was reaffirmed
but without the initiative it had formerly exercised in
carrying it out .... The Systems Analysis office would
limit itself to evaluation and review, and, by implica-
tion, would not put forward independent proposals of it's
own. (Enthoven and Smith, 1971, pp. 333-334)
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The need for additional defense policy reform was
emphasized again in the early 1980's. Hundreds of U.S.
servicemen's lives were lost in military operations that went
wrong (i.e., Iran, 1980, Beirut and Grenada, 1983). The
nation had failed to achieve the political-military objectives
that had motivated the operations. Commissions were appointed
to investigate the circumstances surrounding the failed
exercises.
Reports consistently pointed to structural flaws in the
organization that planned and carried out the operations
and in routine procedures for planning and conducting
military operations. (Blackwell and Blechman, 1990, p. 2)
Also during this time period several pricing scandals were
publicized, emphasizing the need for change in the defense
acquisition procedures.
The calls for defense reform in the 1980's culminated in
the Report of the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on
Defense Management (the Packard Commission) and the
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization
Act, both completed in 1986 .... They aimed to cause a
cultural change in the approach taken to defense
policymaking and in providing for the nation's security.
(Blackwell and Blechman, 1990, p. 2)
Implementation of these reforms was needed before another
military operation went wrong, but it was hampered by other
circumstances: 1) The defense budget was declining in real
terms by 198 6 and the gap between the fiscal demands of the
defense program and the resources being made available was
growing. The political issue between Congress and the White
House became: how much of a cut in defense might be possible,
rather than, how to spend the amount allocated to defense more
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effectively. In December, 1987 President Reagan met with
members of Congress resulting in a 10 percent cut in the
current year (FY88) defense budget that had to be implemented
in less than six weeks. 2) Key leadership and budgetary
changes in the Department of Defense monopolized the attention
of senior officials rather than focusing on organizational and
procedural reforms. Several senior Reagan Administration
officials left government service in the late 1980' s,
including Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger in 1987.
Weinberger could be viewed as a major reason that the reforms
of 1986 were not implemented completely. "... defense
reform cannot work unless the secretary of defense is
personally committed to implementing whatever proposals are
on the table." (Blackwell and Blechman, 1990, p. 6) The
recommendations of the Packard Commission and the Goldwater-
Nichols Act disagreed with Weinberger's management style that
had been in place since he started in 1981. The proposals
reflected criticism of his management practices.
The tasking of the secretary of defense in the Goldwater-
Nichols Act to provide clear and timely written policy
guidance reflected a concern in Congress that Secretary
Weinberger did not have a strategy and was not providing
Congress with resource-constrained Department of Defense
goals that would aid Congress in evaluating Department of
Defense programs. (Blackwell and Blechman, 1990, p. 145)
Sponsors of the reorganization act tried to avoid direct
criticism of Weinberger's management of the Defense Depart-
ment, but their legislation was aimed at correcting what was
referred to as the
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shortcoming of Weinberger's administration: the failure
of the civilian leadership to articulate national strategy
and relate strategy to military missions and fiscally
constrained program priorities. (Blackwell and Blechman,
1990, p. 126)
The Packard Commission and the Goldwater-Nichols Act aimed
to restore the proper balance among authority, responsi-
bility, capacity, and accountability in the chain of
command so that in future military operations the clarity
of command relationships will itself help to bring about
a successful conclusion, rather than hampering effective
action. The Goldwater-Nichols Act, in particular, aimed
at making the chain of command an uninterrupted straight
line from the President to the secretary of defense,
through the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the
commanders in chief of the unified and specified commands.
In principle, all other components of the Defense Depart-
ment should recognize that they exist solely to support
this chain of command and to ensure it's success in
battle. (Blackwell and Blechman, 1990, p. 11)
Taken a whole, four major results of both the Packard
Commission and the Goldwater-Nichols Act as they relate to the
planning, programming, and budgeting areas are:
1. To strengthen the role of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)
.
2. To create the position of Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS)
.
3. To improve the quality, influence, and importance of
the Joint Staff and to make the Joint Staff respon-




To strengthen the influence of the commanders in chief
of the unified and specified commands in the alloca-
tion of resources (financial, personnel, and material)
of the Department of Defense. (Blackwell and
Blechman, 1990, p. 151)
The Packard Commission also recommended the adoption of
biennial budgeting and multi-year procurement contracts.
These changes require the "legislature to commit itself to the
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limits of the constitutional flexibility it has in appropria-
ting public funds." (Blackwell and Blechman, 1990, p. 7)
Practices that would provide stability in defense plans,
programs, and budget would reduce Congress' flexibility to
impose changes in response to international conditions, or
domestic and political events. Bottom line for Congress is
. . . conditions affecting the impact of their decisions
can change so rapidly that elected officials are reluc-
tant, in effect, to delegate their fiscal responsibility
to the executive branch in a single vote for the entire
legislative term. (Blackwell and Blechman, 1990, p. 7)
Congress has required the Defense Department to submit two-
year defense budgets which began in the 1988/1989 submission.
But the legislature has not been willing to reform it's own
ways of doing business. "... money is policy and annual
budgeting is a powerful congressional tool for closely
controlling executive action." (Art, 1985, p. 405)
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IV. DEFICIENCIES IN OUR PRESENT SYSTEM TO ADDRESS
NEAR-TERM WARFIGHTING CAPABILITIES
This thesis has analyzed the major attempts that have been
made over the past 50 years to reform the defense budgeting
and decision-making process since WWII. These reforms in the
defense department have largely been directed at putting
decision-making power into the "right" hands to ensure our
national security objectives are achieved efficiently and
economically. The record is not one of unanimous success in
as much as major deficiencies still exit.
Since the 1970 's Congressional oversight has been on the
increase.
The combination of concern over national budget
priorities, economic inflation, the Watergate scandal,
dis-enchantment with the results of the Vietnam War,
defense-procurement-cost increases, and weapon-system cost
overruns gave Congress the impetus to increase its control
over the executive branch through a series of Congres-
sional committee and budget process reforms implemented
during the 1970's. (Jones and Bixler, 1990, p. 90)
This environment plus the rising deficit and increased outside
interest groups have pushed Congress into a line item level
examination of the defense budget. Congressional oversight is
now focused on detailed budgetary matters instead of the
preparedness of the armed forces to accomplish our nation's
security objectives. As discussed in the previous chapter,
Congress has not been willing to appropriate defense funds
biennially since that would weaken their strong hold on the
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executive and as elected officials they do not want to limit
their ability to react to the rapidly changing political
environment. While a greater degree of rationality may have
been brought to the process, the people who allocate resources
do not have to fight the 5 to 15 year horizon in the Pentagon.
With attention continually focused on getting the annual
budget approved, our operational capabilities become a second
concern.
The Packard Commission and the Goldwater-Nichols Act
attempted to establish a distinct line of authority, capacity,
responsibility, and accountability. This clear line is
blurred by the overlapping involvement of the military
departments in operational matters through their "de facto
control of the component commands of the unified commands."
(Blackwell and Blechman, 1990, p. 11) The military depart-
ments continue to undercut the real authority of the unified
and specified commanders through their continued dominance in
the resource allocation process. The lack of progress in
resolving this problem has created an environment in the
planning and conduct of military operations where disasters
could easily occur. There must be one clear, responsible and
accountable chain of command, especially during combat. The
chairman of the Joint Chiefs and his staff must increase their
involvement in clarifying and enforcing the chain of command
to include the Unified Command Plan and the Unified Action
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Armed Forces which are the two basic documents specifying
command authority.
It is the contention of this thesis that the present
planning and budgeting system encourages this blurred chain of
command through the allocation of defense resources. The
military departments dominate planning and resource processes
in the Department of Defense because they dominate the
information gathering and budget management functions which
are the basis of the planning, programming, and budgeting
process. While there are procedures in place through which
the unified and specified commands provide input to the
decision-making process, their input has little influence on
actual decisions.
In fact the CINCs are routinely co-opted through the over-
riding influence of the military department's staffs of
the component commanders; the latter, despite their formal
subordination to the unified commanders, depend on their
military departments chains for resources and authority.
Responsibility and accountability suffer in the process.
(Blackwell and Blechman, 1990, p. 12)
The military departments exert powerful influence over
military operations because they have strong constituencies in
Congress and among interest groups (local constituencies,
business interests, etc.) that depend on the resources that
the military departments channel to them. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the CINCs do not have these constituent relation-
ships because they do not have resources to channel. The
Defense Resources Board (DRB) is a forum where the military
department interests, unified and specified command interests,
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and concerns of the Office of the Secretary of Defense are all
addressed. But, the DRB is resource dominated where defense
policy is driven by resource trade-offs not operational
requirements
.
Pursuant to a Goldwater-Nichols Act the chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff asked the principal CINCs if they wanted
to have their own budgets. The CINCs responded negatively
with two commonly stated reasons,
(1) that they want to concentrate on operations and
operational planning, and (2) that they do not have the
staff needed to support a larger budgetary role. The
issue involved here could be put differently: how can
they concentrate on operational planning and readiness
without the discriminate leverage that their own budgets
would give them to assure adequate attention to commonly
neglected problems of little interest to the services such
as CINC centered exercises and CINC centered shifting
resource management personnel from other installations in
proportion to the amount of money shifted. (Blackwell and
Blechman, 1990, p. 139)
The remainder of this chapter will explain examples where
these deficiencies have had negative impact on actual opera-
tions.
In April, 1980 a mission to rescue American hostages in
Iran became a disaster. "... facts suggest that the
operation exposed serious deficiencies in the military
decision-making system that may require substantial change."
(Ryan, 1985, p. 1)
Army Colonel Charlie A. Beckwith, leader of the assault
team made the decision to abort the mission after three of his
eight helicopters were unable to proceed due to mechanical
failures. During the evacuation a helicopter sliced into a
25
transport plane, both bursting into flames and killing eight
men. "The remainder flew to safety, leaving behind five
helicopters, weapons, communication equipment, valuable secret
documents, and maps . . . . " (Ryan, 1985, p. 1) The gear and
documents left were to be destroyed by a U.S. attack aircraft,
but the strike was cancelled by President Carter because it
would have jeopardized about 40 Iranians at the landing site.
A review group was appointed to investigate the incident
and surrounding circumstances. Admiral James L. Holloway, III
was nominated to head the group of five flag rank officers.
They were directed "to identify only those "lessons learned"
in a military sense." (Ryan, 1985, p. 4) With this narrow
mandate, many questions went unanswered.
Many of the errors that took place stemmed from President
Carter's extreme emphasis on absolute secrecy of the opera-
tion. Many things that could have been done to improve the
possibility of success were not done because of this compart-
mentation.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not implement their
Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) because it was believed that
doing so would cause too many people to know of the
plan.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff also would not authorize use
of a current JCS developed framework for a Joint Task
Force (JTF)
.
Without the authority to use these already existing
formats, Major General James Vaught, who was assigned to lead
the task force, had to resort to ad hoc methods to plan and
organize the mission. Even though Vaught was an experienced,
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highly regarded leader, he lacked experience in special
operations and in planning and coordinating joint service
operations. The Joint Chiefs were only briefed on the mission
a few times. Since none of them had special operations
experience themselves, critical questions concerning the plan
were never asked, i.e., weather conditions, helicopter
reliability, spare parts, etc. There was no complete testing
mechanism of the plan. In fact, participants had no idea of
any other participants directions. There had been talk at one
time about bringing together a small group of experts to
advise on the plan, but it was decided that it would pose
security problems. At the time of the investigation, no one
would tell who was credited with that decision.
Instead of utilizing the fully staffed and integrated
intelligence component of JCS, Vaught named his own intelli-
gence officer (J-2) and provided him with a small staff.
Compartmentation imposed by security caused many problems.
"Unwittingly, the J-2 staff sometimes failed to distribute
incoming intelligence to officers who had a valid interest in
the information." (Ryan, 1985, p. 34) Many other incidents
involving intelligence were cited in the investigation report,
with a recommendation that in the future the Joint Chiefs
place the DIA director in charge of an interagency intelli-
gence unit to support the task force.
The lack of a clear chain of command seriously hampered
the uncovering of weaknesses that later surfaced during the
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operation. It was not clear who was responsible to ensure the
helicopter unit attained special operations capabilities.
There were several officers involved but Vaught never outlined
a distinct line of authority and responsibility between
himself and others in the planning process. With only 12 days
before the execution of the operation, Vaught named Lt General
Gast as deputy task force commander. The fact that Gast
outranked Vaught caused additional confusion.
Plagued by inexperienced planning, excessive security
restrictions that severely handicapped planning and execution
of the operation, and the lack of a clear chain of command
throughout the entire operation, the mission was doomed from
the start.
On 23 October 1983, disaster again hit U.S. troops as a
truck loaded with TNT passed marine sentries guarding the
compound in Beirut, heading straight for the headquarters
building. The explosion that followed killed 241 men.
Admiral Robert L. J. Long was appointed to head an investiga-
tive commission on the incident.
When the Commission's findings were announced they did not
mince words, "that the officials, who had placed the marines
in a plainly hazardous situation, apparently were ignorant of
the history of Middle East terrorism." (Ryan, 1985, p. 152)
These officials never thought that a person would give their
own life to attack U.S. troops. The commission report also
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emphasized the lack of attention given to the safety of the
marines by the President and his advisors.
Similarly, throughout the chain of command, there was no
clear definition of the meaning of "presence" for the
marines, nor was the responsibilities of marine commanders
clearly spelled out regarding the security of the Beirut
airport. (Ryan, 1985, p. 152)
The Commission found that General Roger's specialist for
security matters had evaluated the embassy bombing in April,
1983 and had predicted that a more spectacular attack would
probably take place in Beirut, with the marines being the
logical target. This information was not passed to the marine
commander, Colonel Geraghty. Intelligence reports about
terrorist action were not sent to Geraghty in a timely manner.
Plus, he had no intelligence expert to assist him in
evaluating the reports he did receive.
According to the commission, Colonel Geraghty did not
receive such assistance and was, therefore, severely
restricted in carrying out his mission. Specifically,
there was no aggressive command follow-up nor was there
continuing command assessment of the task assigned to him
or of the support that he required. (Ryan, 1985, p. 153)
Again the deficiencies of the system and the lack of a
clear chain of command, responsibility, and accountability
were exposed at the expense of American lives.
Two days after the Beirut incident, the U.S. initiated a
successful invasion in Grenada. The White House made a
conscious decision that there would be no second-guessing by
civilian officials. Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf was tasked
with a military objective, with no crippling conditions
attached. This was not a swift surgical strike that is
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desired in operations such as this, but the U.S. troops did
their job and achieved the mission objectives.
The success was not without operational flaws.
The failure of the U.S. military to know that the students
they were trying to rescue had a main campus at Grand Anse
seems typical of the misplaced emphasis and perception
that plagued relations between the two countries from the
outset. While President Reagan made decisions from aerial
photographs from satellite surveillance, the military had
no maps and did not know where the campus was located.
The military was also plagued by more serious problems.
The collision of aircraft, the bombing of their own
positions, and other oversights in coordination pale by
comparison with the episode in which the soldiers in the
heat of battle fired the light, antitank weapons (LAWs) at
the Russian-made armored personnel carriers and they
failed to go off. Perplexed, the soldiers and officers
wondered if the Russians were using some new metal or coat
in their construction. The answer was much more elemen-
tary and closer to home: the LAWs being used were poorly
constructed. While the soldiers were engaged in battle on
October 25, the first day of operation Urgent Fury, the
administration in Washington was engaged in a battle of
another kind, explanation and defense. (Burrowes, 1988,
p. 83)
Flaws in the chain of command have victimized the military
for decades. Looking back to the 1960 's the Bay of Pigs
episode has similar characteristics as the Iranian Rescue
Mission of 1980.
In April, 1961, President Kennedy decided to support an
attempt by anti-Castro commandos to overthrow Fidel Castro's
regime in Cuba. Assigning a Central Intelligence Agency
civilian official to be in charge of the mission, President
Kennedy directed that even the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not
to be informed about the plan. Again, secrecy and inexperi-
ence in special operations of the planners condemned a mission
to fail before it even started. How many times must the
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military be subjected to the same errors in judgment before
the process and procedures are changed?
The capture of the USS Pueblo in January, 1968 is a prime
example of a fragmented chain of responsibility. At the time
of the incident there were so many federal agencies and organ-
izations involved in the operation of the Pueblo that the
Pacific Fleet commander no longer had the authority to direct
the ship's movement without Washington's approval. Washington
bureaucracy had diluted command responsibility and authority.
In contrast, the Mayaguez incident May, 1975 is an example
of a successfully executed rescue mission. President Ford
immediately involved the correct players for planning the
operation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Within hours of the
capture, a U.S. Navy Orion patrol plane had located the ship.
The circumstances surrounding the mission highlighted the need
for a fast-reaction multiservice counterterrorists force. A
force such as this would have eliminated the ad hoc element of
the rescue mission. "A special command, with it's own air
transport, helicopters, and assault teams, could have been on
the scene within twenty-four hours." (Ryan, 1985, p. 143)
During this mission, Washington leaders still were persistent
in getting involved in the control of the operation. Squadron
leaders were constantly interrupted to answer telephone calls
from seniors in Washington. These calls were presumably in
response to questions from the White House. During any combat
operation, set procedures outline the issue of progress/status
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reports. These procedures take into account the events that
would be taking place at the same time. Men can lose their
lives while a squadron leader is answering questions from
senior officials during combat. After the experiences of the
1960 's and 1970's, why did the disaster in Iran take place in
1980? Lack of a clear chain of command, decision-making
authority not in the right hands to ensure sufficient planning
and execution of operations, and involvement of officials who




Numerous alternatives to the present Defense Planning
System have been proposed. This fact alone emphasizes the
concern of many that the deficiencies of the present system
are critical and must be addressed. The previous chapter
outlined some major flaws in the present system and the
operational outcomes that result. For the purpose of this
thesis a mission-oriented approach is evaluated as a model for
an alternative to the present Defense Planning System. This
alternative was developed by L. R. Jones and Glenn C. Bixler
and presented in the book Mission Financing to Realign
National Defense .
The Jones-Bixler model is based on the premise that, "The
management control, budgeting, and accounting structures used
by the Department of Defense do not correspond well either to
it's mission and responsibility structure or the organization
as a whole." (Jones and Bixler, 1992, p. 209) The contention
is that if mission responsibility, organization structure and
control structure were better aligned, budget preparation and
execution would be more precise. To understand the misalign-
ment we must examine the present chain of command for
responsibility, control, and financial areas of the Defense
Department.
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The responsibility structure of the Department of Defense
is comprised of the unified and specified commands, and the
service commands and are tasked with defending U.S. national
security interests. This is the operational side of the
house.
The control structure of the Department of Defense flows
downward from the President and Congress, who define national
objectives and priorities; through the Office of the Secretary
of Defense to the military secretaries and chiefs of the
military departments, who develop the policies to achieve the
objectives; to the service military commanders and the
remaining military chain of command, who strive to achieve the
desired outcomes. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also exerts some
control which flows out to the unified and specified commands.
As discussed earlier in this thesis, there are problems in the
control structure as to responsibility, accountability, and
authority that have caused severe problems during military
operations.
The financial structure flows down from Congress and the
President to the Department of Treasury and, under the
authority of Congress and the Executive branch Office of
Management of Budget, flows to the Department of Defense. The
Department of Defense comptroller, serving the Secretary of
Defense, is at the hub of the DOD wheel as resources are
allocated to the military department comptrollers within each
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service passing funds on to the command and sub-command
levels, eventually reaching the activities and installations
of each service.
"In theory, the control structure and financial structures
of an organization serve the mission or responsibility
structure." (Jones and Bixler, 1992, p. 210) When the
Department of Defense was examined from this perspective, it
was found that the control structure dominated the
responsibility structure and the financial structure either
dominated or acted independently of the other two. The
mission-oriented concept would change the allocation of
resources to place the responsibility structure in the lead to
define and acquire the necessary assets to defend national
security interests.
Under this model,
. . . the responsibility for operations and procurement
(including military construction) would be placed at the
command level, where military commanders, as experts in the
business of deterring as well as prosecuting war, would
specify their needs and then, employing their own staffs of
military and civilian specialists, would administer their
operating and capital budgets to finance military operations.
Most notably, under this approach the commands would contract
for most support functions and procure military capital assets
through multiyear contracting directly with the private
sector. A significant amount of capital investment contract-
ing would be accomplished through cooperative purchasing
involving multiple commands. (Jones and Bixler, 1992, p. 211)
The role of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the
military department secretaries would remain the same as now
concerning budget rationing authority and liaison between the
military and the Executive Branch. The decentralized command-
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based system would simplify the control structure of the
Department of Defense. The high profile Pentagon budgetary
and regulatory control would no longer be as necessary. The
financial structure would serve the command's needs in
addition to that of Congress and other agencies and depart-
ments associated with defense resources. Accounting systems
would support command operating needs, providing as close to
real-time budget information, (i.e., budget authority, obliga-
tions, and balances) as possible. The accounting system would
also provide performance indicators tied to dollars to enhance
commander's decision making when considering performance
requirements issues. Performance would tie mission
accomplishments to budgets with the results transmitted to the
military department secretaries and on up the chain of
command
.
This reform model also extends to Congress.
If Congress were to reform it's budget process to
eliminate separate budget, authorization, and appropriation
committees and instead, employ only one joint budget committee
to perform the work of budget review and appropriation for
both houses, it is much more likely that performance informa-
tion would be used to guide defense-resource decision making.
Under this approach, a single budget committee for defense
resource decision making in Congress would appropriate the
operating portions of the DOD budget for a minimum of two
years, without any specific spending ceilings or floors on
individual programs or items in the budget. Report language
would be confined to the specification of general national
security outcome preferences by mission and command area. The
investment or capital acquisition accounts in the DOD budget
would be appropriated on a five-year basis, and would be fully
or advance funded where justified in terms of production
efficiency. Under this approach, appropriations would be made
in direct correspondence to the command structure proposed by
the DOD. (Jones and Bixler, 1992, pp. 212-213)
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General Colin Powell spoke in favor of a mission concept
before Congress and indicated that the planning, programming,
and budgeting for the Department of Defense could be
formulated according to four mission components: Atlantic
forces, Pacific forces, strategic forces, and contingency
forces. Also a component could be added to a mission format
to provide for management support forces such as the Pentagon
and other management support activities.
Under this proposal, financial audit would continue but
could be simplified if one agency were to be authorized for
each branch of government to perform audit and evaluation
functions. Congressional oversight could focus on whether
were met instead of how they were met.
To quote Jones and Bixler,
The financial role of policy-makers would be to specify in
general , lump-sum terms how much money should be spent
attempting to achieve major national security goals by
command and mission area. Presumably, decision makers
would reward success at the command level with additional
funding and would provide lower funding where problems
were resolved and commitments were reduced. Likewise,
failure at the command level would be penalized by with-
drawal or shift of funding. Command accountability would
be much more direct to the Secretary of Defense, the
President, and Congress under the expectation that success
and failure would be reflected directly in multiyear
budget decisions. Apportionment of funds would flow from
the Treasury through the OSD to the commands as determined
by Congress. The President's Office of Management and
Budget, as an intermediary agency, and the military
department secretariats would not be required to control
the budget apportionment process as tightly as they do at
present under the more decentralized process as much
greater budget-execution control authority and accounta-
bility would be vested in the commands. (Jones and
Bixler, 1992, pp. 213-214)
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In essence, the mission-budget process would be much more
centralized for Congress, but budget preparation and
execution in the DOD would operate in a much more
decentralized was than under the existing system. Commit-
ments and national security objectives still would be
determined by Congress and the President, but decisions on
operating and support spending, and most procurement
spending, would be made at the command level with much
more authority delegated to military commanders and their
comptrollers than is the case at present. The basic
assumption supporting this approach is that military
commanders know best what types of operations, hardware,
facilities, and equipment are needed to deter threat and
to engage in war when required. Further it is assumed
that they are capable of specifying and obtaining the
capital assets needed from private sector firms with much
less insulation from the management of such transactions
by the Pentagon and Congress. (Jones and Bixler, 1992, p.
214)
It may be anticipated that opposition to this model would
be deep in Congress and the Pentagon. The belief is that the
decentralization of the defense acquisition process would
cause greater duplication of effort and lack of standardiza-
tion in weapons procurement resulting in acquisition being
more costly and less efficient.
In defense, Jones and Bixler state:
. . ., the objection to unnecessary duplication in the
purchase of very expensive military hardware is misdirected.
First, it assumes that commands could not agree to make
cooperative purchases. Second, it ignores the economic theory
of industrial organization that indicates that greater
industry and product diversity would result in more competi-
tion, greater product choice, closer match between product
characteristics and end-user preferences, and a more
diversified and efficient industrial base. (Jones and
Bixler, 1992, pp. 215-216)
Jones and Bixler address the standardization objection:
The market-orientation of the mission-budget approach,
. . . would result in less rather than more standardiza-
tion of product if, by supplying more differentiated
products, the defense industry could better serve the
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needs of it's customers. This is precisely what a market
is supposed to accomplish. Such a system would stimulate
far more competition and differentiation in the defense
industry itself, which is now dominated by too few firms
that do not operate efficiently due to their monopsony/
monopoly and duopoly relationship to Congress and the
Pentagon, and the predictable flow of direct and indirect
subsidies from government. (Jones and Bixler, 1992, p.
215)
The operating accounts of the budget would be proposed by
the CINCs, in accordance to criteria set by OSD and the
military departments, to Congress. Congress would still
appropriate funds, OSD and the military departments would
still allocate the funds, but the allocation would be on a
per-unit subsidy basis to relate service costs directly to
units of service production. This would allow military
commanders greater discretion in managing operating (O&M)
accounts, excluding military personnel accounts which would
remain centrally managed, and "... because the acquisition
budget would be controlled by the commands a closer fit
between operating and investment spending would be achieved."
(Jones and Bixler, 1992, p. 216)
This model would require less top-down management
resulting in fewer staff in OSD and military departments in
the Pentagon. The PPBS process would remain, but the
programming phase would be a command function. A core
comptrolller staff would be required to combine and coordinate
the budget proposals for review by OSD and Congress, but the
need for the Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) as it is now,
would be eliminated.
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The critical defense policy issue of the next decade is to
manage the large-scale reduction of the U.S. force structure
and the defense industrial base without threatening their
creativity, flexibility, or efficiency . . . The mission
approach to management control and budgeting would attempt to
look at resources on the basis of threat, commitments, desired
outcomes, and national security priorities. It would
emphasize the importance of policy to guide budgets rather
than having budgets drive policy. (Jones and Bixler, 1992,
pp. 22 0, 22 2)
This model does not affect the manner in which war would
be pursued, but would provide both joint and individual
service commanders better and more efficiently produced
weapons through increased control of the operation and
acquisition accounts.
One of the many objections that can be anticipated from
the DOD concerning this model would involve the newly
established Defense Business Operations Fund (DBOF) . DBOF is
the consolidation of all DOD Industrial Fund Activities.
These are activities that provide goods and services to
government agencies on a reimbursable basis and are non-
profit. They operate on a revolving fund concept, which means
that Congress places a beginning balance in the account and
the account is reimbursed by receiving activities upon
completion of service or receipt of product. DBOF is the
responsibility of the DOD Comptroller. Prices represent the
full cost of service or product vice direct cost as prices had
previously been calculated. Under the model presented,
commands would be authorized to enter into multiyear military
assets with the private sector . As each command would have
control of their operating and acquisition budgets plus be
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able to coordinate purchasing with multiple commands the price
on a multiyear contract could be tough competition for DOD.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has examined some of the changes in defense
decision-making made since the 1940's. Each reform has
intended to correct a deficiency in the defense decision
process, whether it was the lack of authority for the
Secretary of Defense, or the lack of a distinct line of
authority, capacity, responsibility, and accountability in
DOD.
With the reduction in active duty personnel experienced
today and the reduction in defense resources, acquisition of
properly constructed weapons and appropriate training of
personnel is paramount to the security of this nation.
However, proper organization and communication are crucial to
efficient military operation.
It is the proposal of this thesis that changing the
allocation of resources to provide the unified and specified
command level with operating and acquisition budgets will in
turn enhance the military's near-term warfighting capability.
The model presented in this thesis would not correct all of
the problems associated with the present system, but it would
move the process closer to the approach necessary for each
level of participants in the decision-making process to have
more appropriate power and authority in the process. At
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present, managers that must execute operations are being
denied an active role in decision-making.
Many of the errors and mishaps cited in this thesis are
traced back to the lack of a clearly defined chain of command,
poor planning, lack of experience, poorly constructed weapons,
and at times, lack of attention to safety of personnel.
The allocation of defense resources must compliment the
organization of DOD chain of command. Decision-makers must be
close enough to operations to evaluate the weapons and
training required to meet the demands of their region of
responsibility. With a horizon of 5 to 15 years in the
Pentagon for a new weapon system, the emphasis can not only be
on long range planning, greater emphasis must be placed on
operational readiness.
Congressional oversight must be relaxed and backed out of
the intricate detail it presently involves to become focused
on meeting the security needs of this nation. At the same
time, military leaders must be provided the means by which to
achieve these security objectives. Annual appropriating of
defense resources severely cripples the ability of planners to
instill any stability in the process. Since any procedural
change implemented to increase the stability of the defense
budgeting process would limit the Legislatures flexibility to
react to the rapidly changing environment, Congress is not
likely to change their present way of doing business.
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Change is never easy and seldom without opposition. The
CINCs have decline the unofficial offer to control defense
funds on their own behalf. As discussed in Chapter III, their
two main objections can be countered. In the Navy process,
each CINC provides a list of their top five priority
requirements to the cognizant resource sponsor in OPNAV.
Aside from those top five issues, the resource sponsor is not
obligated to fund any other particular CINC requirement.
Since the DRB does not address operational requirements the
CINCs have not other avenue to utilize in their effort to
obtain adequate funding. Providing the unified and specified
command level with operating and acquisition budgets will
ensure their requirements are fulfilled to accomplish their
mission objectives.
In answer to the research questions indicated in Chapter
I, this thesis finds the following:
Question 1: Does the present Defense Planning System
unduly emphasize force capabilities in the future at the
expense of operational readiness in the present?
Finding: The time horizon of 5 to 15 years in the
Pentagon coupled with annual appropriation of defense
resources inhibits the ability of decision-makers to focus on
the importance of operational readiness in the present. A
blurred chain of command throughout the planning and execution
of operational missions cause mishaps. Greater emphasis must
be placed on the operational readiness of the forces and
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experts must be aggressively involved in the planning process.
Planning of the missions discussed in this thesis took place
to far removed from actual execution, the results being
disastrous. Weapons that U.S. troops were using in some cases
were of poor quality. Decision-making must be at a level of
management that is close enough to operations to ensure proper
equipment and training of personnel. The reductions in force
and acquisition of today's environment dictates more efficient
use of all resources. The decision-making process must also
be changed to better serve the operational commands.
Question 2: Will a change in the allocation of defense
resources as proposed in the mission-oriented model actually
enhance near-term warfighting capabilities?
Finding: The conclusion of this thesis is that changing
the allocation of resources will enhance near-term warfighting
capabilities. The unified and specified commands have limited
access to and very little influence in the decision-making
process. The allocation of resources must compliment the
organization of DOD and the chain of command. This thesis has
highlighted the power that the military departments have in
Congress and through constituent relationships while the JCS
and the unified and specified commands do not have any
leverage. Reforms have been implemented to strengthen the
authority of the unified and specified commands through
enforcement of the chain of command by JCS, i.e., Goldwater-
Nichols Act. The additional change in the allocation process
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would not only increase the influence and capacity of the
unified and specified commands, it would ensure that budgetary
requirements were met.
A recommended area of further research is to examine the
changes in the acquisition process that would occur if the
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